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Abstract
Anorexia nervosa is currently classed as a mental disorder. It is considered as a puzzling condition, scarcely understood and 
recalcitrant to treatment. This paper reviews the main hypotheses relating to the aetiology of anorexia nervosa. In particular, 
it focuses on family and sociological studies of anorexia. By reflecting on the hypotheses provided within these domains, 
and on the questions that these studies leave unanswered, this paper suggests that anorexic behaviour is understandable and 
rational, if seen in light of ordinary moral values.
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1 Introduction
Since its first descriptions, anorexia nervosa has been con-
sidered as a mental disorder, and it is still classified as such 
in the DSM and the ICD (APA 2013, pp. 329–354 and 
338–345; WHO 2018).
There are several other forms of self-imposed starvation 
(hunger strike, hunger art, religious fasting) (Dresser 1984). 
Self-starvation or at least extreme forms of dieting are also 
central to some sports and professions (for example rock 
climbing, ballet, modelling in the fashion industry). None of 
these others have been classified as mental disorders.
One likely reason for this difference is that anorexic star-
vation appears difficult to understand and outright irrational. 
There appears to be no intelligible purpose in the anorexic 
starvation, no paradigm of socially intelligible values and 
purposes.
In this paper I argue that, contrary to what might look 
like, anorexia is not irrational, and it is not unintelligible 
either. Anorexia makes sense in light of a certain moral 
background. Many analyses of anorexia have missed this 
point or have not given it sufficient weight.
This paper will be structured as follows: in Sect. 1 I pro-
vide a brief description of anorexia. In Sect. 2 and 3 I sum-
marise those that I believe are the most insightful accounts 
of anorexia. In Sects. 4 and 5 I identify some questions that 
these studies leave unanswered and show how certain moral 
beliefs and values play a key part in the genesis of anorexia. 
In the final section I consider a remaining question around 
the anorexic’s ‘real’ control over her choices. For easiness I 
use the pronouns ‘she’ and ‘her’, as the condition still affects 
mainly women (1–4% of women compared to 0.3–0.7% of 
men in Europe according to Keski-Rahkonen and Mustelin 
2016), but it must be recognised that men also suffer from 
eating disorders, and that of course body dissatisfaction can 
manifest itself in different ways.
2  Anorexia Nervosa: A Brief Account
Anorexia nervosa is described as a mental disorder charac-
terised by significantly low body weight, resulting from diet, 
and often accompanied by purging (self-induced vomiting, 
abuse of laxatives) and excessive exercise. The behaviour is 
triggered by the sufferer’s fear of weight gain, which often is 
associated with a denial of the seriousness of the emaciation 
(APA 2013, pp. 329–354 and 338–345; WHO 2018).
Since the first descriptions, anorexia has been presented 
as a mental disorder.
In 1694 Richard Morton provided one of the first known 
descriptions of anorexia. In his Treatise of Consumptions he 
described anorexia as “A Nervous Atrophy, or Consumption 
[which is] a wafting of the body without any remarkable 
Fever, Cough or shortness of breath […]The Causes which 
dispose the Patient to this Disease, I have for the most part 
 * Simona Giordano 
 Simona.giordano@manchester.ac.uk
1 Law School, School of Social Sciences, The University 
of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK
546 S. Giordano 
1 3
observed to be violent Passions of the Mind […] This Dis-
temper as most other Nervous Diseases is Chronical, but 
very hard to be cured, unless a Physician be called at the 
beginning of it.”1
Nearly two centuries later, in 1874, Lasegue in France 
named it “anorexie histerique”, and then “anorexie mentale” 
(Bruch 1974, p. 213), and William Gull around the same 
time in the UK named it anorexia nervosa (Gull 1888).
These names have remained unchanged, as has the idea 
that the condition is a mental illness, and no somatic cause 
has been found for the condition (although genetic factors 
have been identified as correlated to higher susceptibility to 
anorexia—Wang et al. 2011; Trace et al. 2013; Boraska et al. 
2014; Treasure et al. 2015; Bulik et al. 2016).
Dealing with anorexic patients is notoriously difficult. 
Sufferers declare that “they are just not hungry”, but they 
constantly fight against hunger; the anorexic keeps dieting 
despite the painful consequences of starvation (hypother-
mia, low blood pressure, often cramps, intestinal problems, 
insomnia, amenorrhea, just to mention a few).
To other people’s concerns, sufferers typically respond 
by denying that anything is wrong. Anorexics are usually 
secretive about their dieting and are very resistant to the 
idea of changing and getting help: they do not want to gain 
weight; they skip meals and say that they have eaten already, 
they claim that they are full, they might wear loose clothing 
to hide their emaciation and implement several strategies to 
keep on dieting.
Anorexics are often described as ‘difficult to handle’, 
‘incomprehensible’, ‘manipulative’, ‘deceitful’, or, in the 
kindest accounts, as victims of a mental disorder, lacking 
in responsibility and agency. If they refuse help and food, 
they are said to be incapable of deciding, and, on this basis, 
they have usually been subjected to involuntary treatment 
notwithstanding their capacity to understand the material 
facts (Clough 2016).
Anorexia is a puzzling condition: it is scarcely understood 
and difficult to treat (Zipfel et al. 2015; Khalsa et al. 2017; 
Brockmeyer et al. 2018); it has the highest rates of mortal-
ity amongst mental disorders (Fichter and Quadflieg 2016; 
Arcelus et al. 2011) and even when not lethal, it is associated 
with serious morbidity.
At least since the mid 1960s, clinicians, psychologists and 
sociologists have formulated various hypotheses about the 
possible causes of anorexia.
Some consider the extreme behaviours that we see in ano-
rexia as, quite simply, the result of a mental illness. A simi-
lar approach has been used in all the cases that have been 
brought before the English courts: where it had to be decided 
whether a person could be lawfully force-fed, or lawfully 
withdrawn from therapy, invariably the sufferers were said to 
be ‘compelled’ to refuse medical treatment and food because 
of the underlying mental disorder (for an account of these 
cases, see Giordano 2019).
Other scholars have proposed richer analyses of the 
experiences and behaviours of anorexia sufferers: they have 
examined the condition from a sociological perspective (as a 
problem related to social changes particularly after the ‘eco-
nomic boom’); from a feminist perspective (as one of the 
consequences of patriarchal oppression or of media pressure 
and other forms of ‘lookism’) (Orbach 1978, 2005; Dolan 
1994); from a relational perspective as the result of dys-
functional family dynamics (Selvini Palazzoli 1963; Selvini 
Palazzoli et al. 1998).
From these other perspectives, anorexia is not just an 
intra-psychic condition, a mental health problem of the suf-
ferer, but a relational issue, a coping mechanism in highly 
problematic families, or a defence mechanism in stressful 
social contexts: whereas the sufferer might have personal 
and individual vulnerabilities, the causes of her conditions 
are to be sought in the relationships between the sufferer and 
the environment (family and society).
These analyses have been more insightful and complex 
than those that just appeal to the psychiatric diagnosis as 
an explanation for people’s experiences and behaviours. 
However, even those are somehow incomplete. This is not 
to be intended as a negative criticism: it is a feature of the 
most promising hypotheses that they raise further interest-
ing questions.
In the next section I summarise the main findings of these 
studies, and then discuss the outstanding questions that they 
leave unanswered.
3  The Family of the Anorexic
Since the earliest studies, it has been recognised that fam-
ily dynamics are determinant in the genesis of anorexia. 
Anorexia is considered, under this perspective, as a coping 
mechanism (Selvini Palazzoli 1963; MacSween 1995, ch. 
2.4; Briody Mahowald 1992).
One of the first systematic studies of the eating-disor-
dered family was provided by Salvador Minuchin. According 
to Minuchin, eating disorders appear in a particular family, 
which he called ‘psychosomatic family’. This family is typi-
cally characterised by rigidity, enmeshment, overinvolve-
ment, and conflict avoidance. Although not being the sole 
causes for the disorder, such dynamics are, he believed, an 
essential element in the development of eating disorders 
(Minuchin 1981; Eisler et al. 2003, p. 292).
Hilde Bruch, one of the pioneers of eating disorders stud-
ies and therapy, similarly argued that anorexia is a cluster of 
1 Kindly provided by Walter Vandereycken.
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symptoms that emerge in response to dysfunctional family 
dynamics (Bruch 1980, pp. 72–90).
Today it is believed that eating disorders are likely to be 
caused by both biological and psychosocial factors (mul-
tifactorial) (Treasure et al. 2015). However, the relevance 
of family influence on the future anorexic/eating disorders 
sufferer remains little disputed. Families with an anorexic 
member are normally described as highly problematic, 
manipulative and incapable of deep and stable affective 
bonds (Lackstrom and Woodside 1998, pp. 107–108).
Colleagues commonly comment that we ‘must be tired 
of working with those people’ or ‘how do you stand 
it?’ This attitude reflects a general belief that eating-
disordered families are manipulative and resistant to 
change. In some instances our colleagues see the indi-
vidual with the eating disorder as a victim of her dis-
turbed family or at the opposite extreme as a scheming 
manipulator who is purposefully destroying her long 
suffering family in her search for attention (Beaumont 
and Vandereycken 1998, pp. 4–5) (my emphasis).
In a landmark study of anorexia nervosa, Mara Selvini 
Palazzoli, while discussing the family of the anorexic, wrote:
To the superficial observer, this may look like quite 
an ideal family. Generally, parents are completely 
dedicated to their work or to the house, they have a 
high sense of duty and of social and conventional 
norms...[T]here was, in all cases, a permanent state of 
underlying tension...a marked inclination to endless 
and unnerving arguments about the most futile issues, 
which is symptomatic of a hidden aggressiveness 
which needs an outburst...[T]he dominant figure, in the 
family of the anorexic, is the mother: the father is often 
emotionally absent...secretly or openly underestimated 
by his wife. Even in cases in which the father, thanks 
to his intolerant and dictatorial behaviour, seems to 
be the dominant figure, the mother wins...stubbornly 
playing the part of the victim...The daughter easily 
becomes the victim of the mother...the daughter is the 
ideal baby of an invasive, intolerant and hypercritical 
mother [...] (Selvini Palazzoli 1963, pp. 61–62) (my 
emphasis).
A few years later, Hilde Bruch in her seminal work Eating 
Disorders: obesity, anorexia nervosa, and the person within 
(Bruch 1974), reported a number of cases that appeared 
remarkably similar to those described by Selvini Palazzoli.
Brian Turner talked about ‘the anorexic family’ (Turner 
1984) (rather than the anorexic person) and noted that 
these families are invariably characterized by contradictory 
requests of their daughters: on the one hand, these fami-
lies value competitive success, for example in school and 
professional life; on the other hand, they also encourage 
submission rather than the autonomy and independence that 
are necessary to obtain the valued success (Turner 1984, p. 
192).
Since these earlier studies, there has been extensive 
research on anorexia and family dynamics, and all seem 
consistent in presenting anorexia as a coping mechanism 
in dysfunctional dynamics particularly ‘vertical’ dynamics 
(parents to children) (Witton et al. 2007; Vidovic et al. 2005; 
Lock and Fitzpatrick 2007; Tan et al. 2003; Dimitropoulos 
et al. 2015; Lafrance Robinson et al. 2015; Rienecke Hoste 
2015; White et al. 2015).
Wider social contexts appear similarly problematic.
4  The Society of the Anorexic
Up until the 2000s, eating disorders were nearly exclusively 
found in Western countries (Gordon 1990) or westernized 
societies such as South Africa and Santiago (Chile) (Beau-
mont and Vandereyken 1998) or countries that are becoming 
economically emancipated, such as China (Beaumont and 
Vandereyken 1998; Selvini Palazzoli et al. 1998). Although 
the prevalence in low-income countries seems to be on the 
rise, eating disorders still seem to be more prevalent in high-
income Western countries (Erskine et al. 2016; Pike and 
Dunne 2015).
For this reason, eating disorders have been regarded as 
‘culturally bound syndromes’—that is, a cluster of signs 
and symptoms only found in a particular culture or group of 
cultures (Nasser 1997, p. 14). Nasser argued that “cultural 
forces are responsible for this modern morbid phenomenon” 
(Nasser 1997, p. 106).
There seems to be growing evidence that eating disorders 
affect people across the socio-economic spectrum (Mulders-
Jones et al. 2017; Mitchison et al. 2014; Goeree et al. 2011); 
however, anorexia is still more prevalent in high and middle 
socioeconomic segments of society (Darmon 2009; McClel-
land and Crisp 2001).
One of the factors that explain the upsurge of anorexia in 
economically emancipated societies, according to a number 
of researchers, is the change in the social role of women. 
In these societies, expectations of women have, particu-
larly since the 1900s, been conflicting (Komarovsky 1946; 
Novack & Novack 1996).
Mara Selvini Palazzoli writes:
Basically, nowadays the woman is asked to be beau-
tiful, elegant and well-kept, and to spend time on her 
looks; this however, should not prevent her from com-
peting intellectually with men and other women, hav-
ing a career, and also romantically falling in love with a 
man, being tender and sweet to him, marrying him and 
representing the ideal type of lover-wife and oblational 
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mother, ready to give up her degrees…to deal with nap-
pies and domestic stuff. It seems evident that the conflict 
among the many demands…represents a difficult chal-
lenge for adolescents, especially the most sensitive… 
(Selvini Palazzoli 1963, p. 75).
Susie Orbach also noted that in economically emanci-
pated societies women are typically subjected to contradic-
tory expectations: on the one hand autonomy and independ-
ence and, on the other, femininity, nurturance, deference and 
dependency (Orbach 2005). These roles are incompatible and 
the crisis generated by this conflict is faced by refusing food, 
which is, under this perspective, a defence mechanism that 
enables the sufferer to remaining in a limbo between childhood 
and adulthood.
What happens within families thus often naturally mirrors 
social changes and values, which families, consciously or not, 
internalise and by which they begin to shape family dynamics.
MacSween similarly argued that the crisis of the anorexic is 
not due to her own disorders: it is rather the social world that 
is lacerated by conflicting expectations about the behaviour of 
adult women (MacSween 1995, chs. 2, 3).
According to Crisp, faced with impossible demands, the 
anorexic refuses food, unconsciously refusing in this way to 
become a woman. She opts for a small body, where smallness 
is symbolic of a rejection of adulthood, with the conflicting 
demands it carries with itself (Crisp 1977). Food refusal allows 
the person to exercise some control over her life and over oth-
ers (Lawrence 1979, p. 93).
MacSween conducted a number of interviews with anorexic 
patients. She asked them why they believed they had become 
anorexic, and the most common answer was that they felt pow-
erless in their environment and they needed to exercise control 
over at least one portion of their life; the girls were not only 
blaming parents; they said they were sensitive to the expecta-
tions of peers and even of their own expectations of themselves 
(MacSween 1995).
Psychological control is still today considered as one of the 
main causal factors of anorexia (Surgenor et al. 2002, 2003; 
Tan et al. 2003; Froreich et al. 2016).
These accounts are illuminating but, as I anticipated earlier, 
they leave some questions unanswered. One of these is why 
we suffer, if others or society at large have unrealistic expecta-
tions of us. Answering this question requires an analysis of the 
moral values that underpin the relationships in these cases.
5  Why Expectations and Disappointments 
are a Moral Issue
In the analyses of anorexia summarised earlier, anorexia is 
presented as a defence mechanism against the high and con-
tradictory demands that come either from within the family, 
or from society at large. The vulnerable adolescent, over-
whelmed by these demands, unable to fulfil them, opts for a 
small body, a body that she can control and master.
One underlying assumption here is it is natural or under-
standable to be upset, when others set inappropriate expec-
tations of us, and depending on what the expectations are, 
and who sets them, the suffering can be psychologically 
devastating.
But not all expectations cause suffering and upset. If 
I expect that, once you have read this paper, you should 
change your mind about anorexia, my wish might well 
remain unfulfilled. You have no reason to feel inadequate 
or bad because you are letting me down. I have no moral 
claim to your appreciation, and you would not let me down 
by disagreeing with me. My expectations would be entirely 
‘my problem’, as it were, not yours.
The ‘suffering’ of the anorexic, well described in the 
literature, is a suffering that is linked to the sense of disap-
pointment: the anorexic blames herself for not living up to 
expectations, which at times are internalised (see for exam-
ple MacSween 1995). Others, likewise, are also disappoint-
ing, because they set unrealistic expectations and overlook 
the sufferers’ needs.
The root of the suffering in these dynamics is thus not 
the set of expectations per se, but a moral norm: the suf-
ferer has accepted the expectation as a legitimate one, and 
has accepted that disappointing those who have legitimate 
claims is something we should feel bad about.
This might be obvious: most of us would agree that there 
are legitimate moral claims within close relationships, and 
most of us would take it as a sign of moral decency that 
people feel bad when they let down some significant other.
What is less obvious is that the relationship between 
‘victims’ (the object of expectation) and ‘persecutors’ (the 
person/s who set the expectations) is circular and specular: 
victims and persecutors are not juxtaposed to each other (as 
suggested in the literature); they are one and the same.
The victim feels bad or inadequate or even guilty because 
she lets others down; but those who set expectations let the 
victim down too. The victim’s suffering speaks of the oth-
ers’ expectations: it says that those expectations lead to 
emotional pain, and if it is true that disappointing others is 
wrong, then those others too can be expected to set appropri-
ate demands, to change their expectations, to meet the suf-
ferer’s emotional needs. But in the same way as the anorexic 
might be unable to fulfil others’ expectations, so might those 
others. In one sense, those others can also be said to be ‘vic-
tims’ of the sufferer’s unrealistic expectations.
The circularity of expectations and blame is well illus-
trated by the description of the ‘colleagues’ comments, 
offered by Beaumont and Vandereycken (cited earlier in 
the paper): some see the sufferer as a victim of the dis-
turbed family; some see the anorexic as a manipulator, 
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and the family as a victim (Beaumont and Vandereycken 
1998, pp. 4–5). Many shift from one account to the other. 
The clinicians capture the dynamic in place in the fami-
lies observed, but are somewhat absorbed in that dynamic: 
rather than unpacking it, they participate in it, as evi-
denced by their own expressions of frustration, irritation, 
powerlessness, accusations…
Of course relational rupture within families is unlikely 
to result just from a mismatch between expectations; much 
can lead to feelings of disappointment and inadequacy. But 
suffering is only at a superficial observation a response to 
‘inappropriate expectations’. The ‘sufferers’ suffer because 
they accept (perhaps unknowingly) a determined set of 
moral beliefs, according to which disappointing others 
is prima facie morally wrong, and interact with others 
accordingly. The root of the problem is not the expecta-
tions, but the moral beliefs that are intertwined with them, 
the moral logic that underpins the relationships.
It might be that we do have a moral obligation to meet 
certain expectations, particularly within close relation-
ships; it is possible that certain moral codes have positive 
function in the fabric of family life or in the fabric of 
society. Indeed, it might be hard to challenge the moral 
dynamics here because the moral values at stake are per-
haps commonly accepted and might serve some important 
function. In this sense, the continuity between ordinary 
moral values and those that are in place here makes it dif-
ficult to unpick and challenge these.
However, without explicit acknowledgement of the 
moral dynamics at stake here, it is difficult to move beyond 
the frustrating tensions that are well described in the lit-
erature. One might change the expectations, but without 
challenging the system of moral values that give shape to 
the dynamics of expectations/disappointments, the risk is 
to fall foul of the similar dynamics in some other way, or 
to replicate the dynamics in the clinical encounter.
There is another question that remains only partly 
answered in the literature.
The literature suggests that anorexia enables the suf-
ferer to retain control over the self, through control of 
food intake and of her body shape, and at the same time to 
retain control over others (Surgenor et al. 2002,2003; Tan 
et al. 2003; Froreich et al. 2016).
But why does self-starvation enable such control? 
Again, this question cannot be answered without explicit 
acknowledgement of a certain moral background.
6  Starvation and Control
Gilbert Ryle wrote:
There is a doctrine about the nature and place of 
minds which is so prevalent among theorists and 
even among laymen that it deserves to be described 
as the official theory. […] The official doctrine, 
which hails chiefly from Descartes, is something 
like this. With the doubtful exceptions of idiots and 
infants in arms every human being has both a body 
and a mind […] Human bodies are in space and are 
subject to the mechanical laws which govern all 
other bodies in space […] But […] the workings of 
one mind are not witnessable by other observers; its 
career is private […] Underlying this partly meta-
phorical representation of the bifurcation of a per-
son’s two lives there is a seemingly more profound 
and philosophical assumption. It is assumed that 
there are two different kinds of existence or status. 
What exists or happens may have the status of physi-
cal existence, or it may have the status of mental 
existence (Ryle 1949, pp. 13–14).
Different terms are used to refer to the ‘mental capacities’ 
or ‘mental entity’: soul, spirit, reason, intellect, will. The 
terms ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ normally have a religious flavour, 
whereas many contemporary philosophers use the terms 
‘reason’ or ‘rationality’, often considered as to be the fac-
ulty that distinguishes humans from other animals. Many 
influential contemporary speculations on personhood rely 
on a similar conception of the human being, as a being 
that, in its ‘complete’ or ‘higher’ form, possesses ‘mental’ 
capacities—self-awareness, capacity to consider itself as 
the same being over time, and so on (for example, Harris 
1992; Parfit 1976; Engelhardt 1996).
It must be noted that various philosophers and philo-
sophical schools (for example non-Cartesian monism, 
structuralism and post-structuralism) objected against this 
type of metaphysical dualism (for example, Searle 2004; 
Ayer 1990; Inwagen 1980, pp. 283–99).
Despite this, the dualistic conception of the human being 
has been fundamental for Western thought and culture, and 
the association between body and baseness recurs in all eras: 
in the Greek thought, in Christianity, in the patristic doc-
trines, in Scholastic philosophy, in the different confessions 
of Christianity (Catholicism, Protestantism, Puritanism, Cal-
vinism); in Humanism and Renaissance, with their flourish-
ing of Neoplatonic and neo-Aristotelean theories, in modern 
philosophy and in contemporary society as well. Christianity 
in particular hallowed the idea that moral perfection has to 
be found in the detachment from the world and ascension to 
God, and fasting, together with other forms of self-inflicted 
suffering (sleeplessness, isolation and various other forms 
of mortification) became one of the most effective ascetic 
techniques since at least early Christianity (3rd and 4th Cen-
tury AD) (Murchu 1983).
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Max Weber discussed how this metaphysics and the cor-
responding ethic are not only religious but also secular, and 
discussed how pervasive they are in contemporary society 
(Weber 1977). More recently Krogovoy has shown that they 
are still ubiquitous, and has argued that they are likely to 
impact on the way people perceive their physical impulses, 
including hunger (Krugovoy Silver 2003, p. 137). Fasting 
has been associated (and is still associated) with ideas of 
control and purity. Fasting is ‘detox’; it ‘cleanses’ the organ-
ism: this, of course, means that eating is always, more or 
less, a form of pollution. Not only a historical search for 
the value of religious fasting, but a simple google search 
will show hundreds of health farms that advertise fasting in 
similar terms.
This is not to suggest that anorexics fast for religious rea-
sons (for an analysis of the phenomenological similarities 
and differences between anorexic starvation and other forms 
of starvation see Vandereycken and Van Deth 1994, chs. 2, 
11). This is instead to suggest that control of hunger can 
become a coping mechanism because of a certain metaphysi-
cal and moral background, which is likely to be implicitly 
accepted in the systems in which the disorder appears.
Not coincidentally, studies have found that typically peo-
ple with anorexia are particularly sensitive to the ethic of 
perfectionism, discipline, austerity, hard work, spiritual-
ity, guilt, and especially the belief that the submission of 
the ‘physical’ to the ‘spiritual’ is a manifestation of moral 
integrity (for example, Lawrence 1995, pp. 32–5; Duker and 
Slade 2003).
Control of food intake is central to eating disorders, 
together with compensatory practices, such as self-induced 
vomiting, abuse of laxatives, and diuretics. Interestingly, 
these are also called ‘cathartic’ practices. These are prac-
tices through which the person purifies herself of food. It is 
the value placed on self-control and austerity, and the role 
of fasting in achieving these, that seems to be the dominant 
background of the psychology of anorexics.
According to the literature, anorexic symptomatology 
also enables a level of control over the surrounding envi-
ronment. Again, it is possible to understand why this is so 
in light of certain moral values.
Anorexia is not the only form of starvation that enables 
control over others: political hunger strikers use of a similar 
strategy, as do, more commonly, charity appeals (Burman 
2007, ch. 12). In these appeals and advertisements images 
of extremely emaciated people, particularly children, in 
extreme conditions of suffering are displayed. Their suffer-
ing elicits compassion, but it does more than this: the suf-
fering empowers the viewers, giving them literally godly 
powers to sanction life or death (‘if you donate…’); but it 
equally disempowers the viewer, making the moral choice 
obvious (‘simply text…’). Who could be so callous to deny 
1 lb£ that could save a life?
The displayed suffering has leverage because of the blame 
and guilt that are attached to the failure to do something 
for others, especially something that costs so little to us 
and that has considerable benefit for others. Thomas Szasz 
noted that guilty feelings are important mental constraints, 
and that blame and guilt are powerful instruments of social 
control (Szasz 1984). These types of call (the hunger strike, 
the charity appeal, and similar others) thus tap into a moral 
belief that is present in one form or another virtually in all 
moral codes: we should do something to minimise other peo-
ple’s suffering, and failing to do so is condemnable. It is not 
hunger per se that enables control: it is the guilt and blame 
that it elicits that does.
Unlike other forms of self-harm (for example cutting, 
where the person typically hides the scars) anorexia is exhib-
ited: the thinness is proudly worn. Whilst anorexics are usu-
ally secretive about their feeling of hunger, their food rituals, 
the extent of their dieting, their exercise regime, they hide 
to make sure that others do not interfere with their choices: 
their thinness, however, is clearly visible.
The impact of anorexia over the surrounding environment 
is strong. Anorexics elicit anger and even some degree of 
secret admiration (Geerling and Saunders 2015). Even at 
the death’s doors often anorexics refuse medical treatment: 
their stubbornness elicits frustration as well as fear, usually 
both in the families and in the clinical teams. Ultimately, 
anorexics succeed well in disempowering others.
Control of appetite, hunger, exhibition of suffering, can 
be a strategy of control, a defence mechanism, only in con-
texts in which it is accepted that we should feel sorry for 
other people’s suffering and do something about it, and in 
which a moral logic is articulated around this belief. Absent 
the moral belief the coping mechanism would be useless.
As we have seen earlier, in systems in which this moral 
belief is accepted, it is unclear who is causes the suffering 
and who is the victim, who should do what, who is empow-
ered and who is disempowered. The anorexic is clearly 
weak, emaciated and frail, and if it is true (as it probably is) 
that what triggers anorexia is her sense of powerlessness, 
she is also disempowered. So are others, though. As we have 
seen earlier, a similar moral belief triggers the circularity 
of expectations disappointments and reciprocal blame and 
guilt, which is likely to cause the unnerving arm wrestling 
between the anorexic person and others, and which is well 
known to families, sufferers and therapists.
Acknowledging the moral values that underpin anorexia 
is important because it contributes to explain one seeming 
paradox of anorexia: the more starvation weakens the per-
son, the more emaciated the person is, the more she feels 
stronger and powerful. This also contributes to explain why 
the longer anorexia is unresolved, the harder it is to treat it; 
this contributes to explain why so called ‘food orgies’ are 
experienced as shameful, and why the anorexic who gives 
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in and eats often quickly resorts to ‘cleansing’ practices: she 
needs to throw up and get the control back in place.
This is also important because it may provide one alterna-
tive key of action with anorexics and their families: rather 
than working on food intake and rehabilitation, or even on 
the family and social dynamics per se (on what is demanded 
of whom) it might be necessary to concomitantly delve 
deeper in the moral beliefs that render the starvation strat-
egy functional to the systems in which the anorexic lives.
This does not pretend to be an exhaustive analysis of ano-
rexia: it just attempts to add to the existing analyses. Other 
factors (psychological, genetic, cognitive, social, cultural, 
familial) are also likely to play a role in anorexia. Neither 
I am suggesting that the sufferer is conscious of the moral 
values and dynamics that shape anorexia, or that she fasts to 
become ‘morally good’ or to deliberately hurt others. What 
I am arguing is that it is difficult to understand how self-star-
vation could be a strategy to regain overall sense of control 
over one’s life and over others, without explicitly acknowl-
edging the fundamental part played by moral pressure.
7  Don’t Anorexics Lack Control?
Another claim that is found in the literature is that the con-
trol that anorexics exercise is not real: it is ‘apparent’. In 
actual fact, anorexics are out of control.
Other groups of ‘starvers’, it might be argued, can stop 
when they want to: the hunger striker can stop if she wins 
her political battle; the dancers, models climbers, runners 
and so on, can change professions and adopt healthier eat-
ing patterns.
Anorexia is different, it might be believed: typically, an 
anorexic begins a diet, and at that stage her choices are delib-
erate, but then somewhere along the way she loses control 
of the diet, and she spirals down in the grip of the anorexia.
This argument, if true, does not invalidate the previous 
analysis: it might well be that the strategy is successful as a 
‘defence mechanism’ for the reasons explained earlier, even 
if the anorexic becomes at some point unable to stop dieting.
Nonetheless, it is worth reflecting on this argument for 
a number of reasons. One is this: if it is true that anorexics 
are out of control in their continued starvation, there might 
be little point in working on the underpinning moral val-
ues (which I have suggested, can be important in tackling 
anorexia). More importantly, if the claim is true, then it is 
justifiable to intervene with anorexic sufferers even if this 
goes against their wishes (for example, to impose hospitali-
sation and medical treatment). Under my perspective, these 
interventions are not necessarily unethical, but they are not 
straightforward either (Giordano 2019).
The idea that eating disorders sufferers do not have con-
trol over their experiences and behaviour is one that has had 
significant pull in the literature and has taken several forms: 
some have for example argued that anorexia is a form of 
addiction, particularly as it shares important phenomeno-
logical similarities with addictions (Godier and Park 2015). 
Others have argued that anorexics lack free will: because of 
mental disorder, they form overvalued ideas which lead them 
to act in the way they do (Phillipou et al. 2017).
Philosophers have tried to provide various accounts of the 
freedom of will when people seem to deliberately engage in 
self-harming or seemingly irrational conduct. An analysis of 
the notion of free-will is beyond the remit of this paper, and 
I have discussed these various theories elsewhere (Giordano 
2005). However, it is important to consider these broad con-
cerns, at least briefly.
One of the most famous theories of autonomy, which 
focus on the ability to control our actions, desires and will, 
is that proposed by Harry Frankfurt (Frankfurt 1971). Frank-
furt argued that we are autonomous when we exercise some 
control over our desires, not just over our actions. We might, 
for example, desire to smoke, lit up a cigarette and smoke: 
there is an apparent coherence between action, desires and 
will (I want a cigarette, I do not want to stop smoking, and 
I smoke). Alternatively we might have clashing desires and 
will: we might desire to smoke, but wish we didn’t have that 
desire—we might desperately want to quit perhaps, but our 
desire to smoke is so strong that we keep smoking. In nei-
ther case, Frankfurt argued, we are autonomous. The lack of 
coherence between orders of desires is a clear indication of 
lack of free will; but so is the coherence, when the coherence 
is only between ‘lower’ desires and actions.
These types of accounts of autonomy are called ‘multi-
tiers’: they recognise that we have not only different types 
of desires (we might desire to smoke and to sleep at the 
same time, and cannot do both) but different levels of desires 
and volitions; some are more basic, and some are more 
important.
The smoker who wants to quit to take care of his health 
has two orders of desires: at one basic level he wants to 
smoke—he has a desire for a cigarette (first order desire). 
At a higher level he wants not to have that desire (second 
order desire). The smoker, in this account, is autonomous if 
and only if he can form higher order desires and if he is able 
to act accordingly.
If people are unable either to form second order desires, 
or to act accordingly, they are not autonomous. Later, a simi-
lar model has been proposed by Gerald Dworkin (Dworkin 
1988) and David DeGrazia applied it to psychiatric condi-
tions (DeGrazia 1994).
Let us apply this model to anorexia: on this account, 
one could say that the anorexic has a first order desire 
to be thin (although if one see ‘desire to control’ as the 
prime mover of anorexia the account might change signif-
icantly—I will come to this in one moment). She might 
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or might not have a second order desire to get rid of that 
first order desire to be thin. She might want to be thin, 
and that is all she wants. In neither of these two cases, it 
could be argued, the anorexic is truly autonomous. To be 
autonomous, the anorexic should want to get rid of her 
desire for thinness, and take some steps to conform her 
actions to her higher order desire or volition, and show 
some success at this.
There are various problems with these accounts of auton-
omy. One is that the claim that one is not conforming to 
a higher order desire or preference presupposes that there 
is a clear hierarchy of desires and volitions, and that oth-
ers can make a judgment about this. But it is unclear how 
we can make that judgment over other people’s desires and 
volitions. Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse whole blood products 
based on one single interpretation of the bible, not even 
shared by the majority in the Judeo-Christian tradition: it 
is not clear whether their desire or volition to obey such 
interpretation, which might cost one’s life, is to be placed in 
the first or in the second order.
A related problem is that it is not clear that the first order 
desire of the anorexic is to be thin: as we have seen earlier, 
one underlying drive may be the need for control over life 
and the surrounding environment (similarly, it is not clear 
that the first order desire of the smoker is to smoke; his 
desire might be to release stress, for example).
Several other groups of people (models, athletes, artists) 
use extreme forms of food control, and depending on how 
we construe the ‘first order’ desires, these might or might 
not fail the multi-tier autonomy test. Climbers might find 
themselves counting calories because one extra pound will 
be felt on a tough route. A few extra pounds might repre-
sent a serious risk: it is perfectly rational for the climber to 
want to calibrate to the gram the ratio between muscle mass 
and body fat. Some might regard their desires and volitions 
as silly, irresponsible or irrational, and others might regard 
their purposes as understandable and admirable. Whether 
or not they fail the multi-tier test of autonomy depends on 
what kind of items we decide to place on the first or on the 
second order of desires.
Moreover, conflicts between orders of desires and voli-
tions affect us all, and none of us is immune from making 
choices which we know too well that are not good for us. 
Most likely none of us has the control of the will that some 
claim anorexics lack. Obese people are likely to will not to 
will to eat, but nobody has so far seriously suggested that 
the obese is affected by a mental illness and should be com-
pulsorily hospitalised and forced to diet. Many of us might 
wish we had different inclinations, desires and volitions in 
many areas of our lives—we might wish we did wish to stay 
with our unfaithful partners, we might wish we did not care 
so much for our job as to let it impact on our health or family 
life, and so on.
Perhaps the multi-tiers models are correct; perhaps 
extreme or self-harming or risky behaviours are sympto-
matic of mental illness and are proof of lack of autonomy: 
but if we accept this, we are committing ourselves to the 
view that many of us, probably most of us, lack autonomy in 
many ways, at pain of selectively pathologising some forms 
of conduct over many others.
8  Conclusions
Anorexia is one of the few, and perhaps the only, form of 
harmful dieting practices that since at least the 1600s has 
been attributed to a disorder of the mind. Other potentially 
harmful eating practices such as intermittent fasting, nutri-
tionally dubious diets or starvation for artistic purposes, 
sport-related reasons, or career purposes are not considered 
as mental disorders.
There might be various reasons why anorexia has been 
treated as a mental illness. One likely reason is that the 
purposes and goals of anorexics appear unintelligible and 
irrational. It seems difficult to contemplate that one could 
give up their health and life just for the sake of thinness, or 
that even one could bear with the distress and extreme pain 
caused by prolonged starvation.
I have argued that, if seen in light of a certain moral back-
ground, anorexia does not appear irrational: however, this 
challenges ordinary values that are widely accepted. I have 
suggested that the continuity between ordinary values and 
those expressed through anorexic behaviour somehow risks 
thwarting the efforts to unravel anorexia, but that without a 
serious reconsideration of the moral dynamics at stake in 
contexts where anorexia appears, it is difficult to see how 
anorexia can be understood. In this sense, anorexia is not 
a challenging condition just because it is hard to treat: it is 
a challenging condition because it calls us all to reflect on 
and question the repercussion of moral values that many of 
us share.
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